The Irish press, politicians and the Celtic Tiger economy by O'Brien, Mark
1 
 
 
 
The Irish Press, Politicians and the Celtic Tiger Economy  
 
Mark O’Brien 
 
 
The release by Independent Newspapers of the ‘Anglo tapes’ in July 2013 was in many ways 
a cathartic occurrence. More than any other event, the audio recordings from Anglo Irish 
Bank’s telephone system capture the hubris that lay at the heart not only of the bank but of 
the entire Celtic Tiger economy.
1
 The conversations, which occurred in 2008, record for posterity the mentality that helped 
create the largest property collapse in history. The language used by the bank’s executives 
sharply demonstrates the fact that the property boom had been built on nothing other than 
arrogance and an infallible sense of entitlement. Realizing that the bank needed a bailout, its 
chief executive David Drumm is heard announcing that he does not want ‘any fucking 
bolloxology’ from the Central Bank. The strategy to get the Central Bank to commit €7 
billion to Anglo was simple: he would go there ‘with arms swinging [and say] we need the 
moolah, you have it, so you’re going to give it to us and when would that be?’ When asked 
how the €7 billion figure had been calculated, another Anglo executive, John Bowe, is heard 
explaining: ‘I picked it out of my arse’. Bowe is also heard acknowledging that Anglo needed 
more than €7 billion but the strategy was to ‘pull them [the Central Bank] in, you get them to 
write a big cheque and they have to keep, they have to support their money, you know’. 
Although expressed in crude terms, the strategy worked – at a horrendous cost to the 
taxpayer. In September 2008, the Irish government announced a blanket guarantee for the 
banking system and in November 2010 was forced to accept an €85 billion rescue package 
from the EU and the IMF. The arrival of an IMF team to oversee a succession of austerity 
budgets was the harsh wake-up call that all was not as it had seemed in Ireland’s banking 
sector.  
 
Indeed, the language captured on the Anglo tapes is a far cry from the refined public relations 
strategy that characterized the rapid growth of the bank during the Celtic Tiger years. The 
entire episode – the unquestioned expansion of the bank during the boom followed by a hard-
hitting exposé after its collapse – is starkly illustrative of the relationship between journalists, 
financial institutions, and the public. As Davis (2000, p. 284) has pointed out, wide audience 
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interest in business and financial stories generally only occurs ‘if a sensational negative story 
is being reported’. While strong criticism was directed at the former Anglo executives for 
their behaviour and role in creating an unsustainable banking sector, much criticism was also 
directed at the Irish media by the government-appointed commission of inquiry into the 
banking sector. Listing the conditions necessary for a systemic financial crisis to occur, the 
report (Nyberg, 2011, p. 5) included ‘media that are generally supportive of corporate and 
bank expansion, profit growth and risk taking, while being dismissive of warnings of 
unsustainable developments’. The report found that Anglo Irish Bank had been ‘lauded by 
many investors, consultants, analysts, rating agencies and the media as a role model for other 
Irish banks to emulate’ (p. ii). It also noted what it referred to as the ‘relentless media 
attention’ given to the property market and concluded that ‘much of the media 
enthusiastically supported households’ preoccupation with property ownership’ (pp. ii–iii and 
50).  
 
This chapter presents an exploratory analysis of the world of Irish financial journalism in 
which eight financial journalists report their views on how they conceptualize their 
professional roles, routines, and work practices during and after the economic boom. The 
professional lives of financial journalists in other jurisdictions have been thoroughly 
examined within the literature. Davis (2000, pp. 285–86) contends that as business is one of 
the main patrons of media organizations through advertising and information provision, 
business news, in effect, is paid for by business advertising and is largely for business 
consumption. As a result, financial journalists tend to move in small exclusive circles, and 
their journalism reflects the views and values of a narrow business-elite. He concludes that 
‘the corporate sector, combining PR with its advertising and news source advantages, has 
“captured” business and financial news’, and notes that even though some journalists may be 
active in their reportage, in the final analysis ‘business news will always follow corporate 
agendas and ignore non-corporate interests’ (p. 286). 
 
Similarly, Doyle (2006, p. 443) found that while financial journalists ‘are generally highly 
sceptical about “spin” and strongly inclined towards highlighting instances of corporate 
underperformance and mismanagement’, their professional routines and the constraints under 
which they work ‘make it unlikely that financial irregularities obscured within company 
accounts will be detected on a routine or consistent basis’. She concludes that the 
complicated nature of financial markets and the limited interested audience for in-depth 
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analysis means that the capture of financial journalists by corporate elites has less to do with 
the tenor of individual news items than with how such coverage is framed and the values that 
such coverage serves to reinforce (p. 446). 
 
In his interviews with British financial journalists, Tambini (2010, p.158) found that no 
consensus existed about their ‘watchdog role in relation to markets and corporate behaviour’. 
He also found that they agreed on the key challenges facing them – including the fact that 
interested parties, including corporate executives and analysts, were sometimes the only 
source of relevant information – but that they were uncertain on how to respond to these 
challenges. More bluntly, Marron (2010, pp. 73–74) concludes that the Irish media ‘failed to 
probe, to exercise scepticism about what is done and said by those in political and financial 
power’. Describing both general and financial journalists as ‘cheerleaders for Wall Street and 
the City’, she notes that they ‘failed to serve as a watchdog on the powerful, to anticipate and 
predict’. Likewise, Manning (2013, p. 173) found that ‘most financial journalists and most 
international news agencies simply failed to report much of the emerging evidence of the 
growing possibility of collapse’, and notes that among the explanations put forward were ‘the 
complexities of the evidence, the manipulative power of financial public relations, and the 
difficulties of undertaking investigative journalism when newsrooms cut staff’.  
 
The key question for this chapter is whether and to what extent these findings apply to the 
Irish case. The eight journalists interviewed were sampled to ensure variability in type of 
media organization (print, broadcast, wire service), length of financial journalism experience, 
and position in their organization’s editorial hierarchy, and were granted anonymity on the 
grounds that they were critiquing their peers and employers, and that the views expressed 
were their own and not those of their news organizations. The journalists, hereinafter 
identified by the letters A to H, were overwhelmingly experienced: six had been reporting on 
financial matters for between five and ten years, one for between one and five years, and one 
for more than ten years. All were questioned on how they viewed the role of financial 
journalist, sources relationships, professional constraints, how their organizations treated 
financial stories, whether financial journalism had been unduly uncritical during the 
economic boom, whether this had changed in light of the crisis, and whether, in light of the 
crisis, they felt they now could freely critique the financial sector.   
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Perceived role and work practices  
In terms of roles and work practices, almost all the interviewees viewed the role of the 
financial journalist as being the same as other reporters who cover a specialist area. Journalist 
E believed the specialism’s ‘basic role should be the same – to keep the audience regularly 
informed of developments and act as a form of watchdog for wrongdoing’, though he 
concluded that ‘it often acts as a cheerleader for capitalism, distributing company news but 
rarely critiquing what’s going on beyond basic profit/loss and investment return figures’. 
Journalist A believed its role was ‘holding business people and organisations to account and 
explaining complex events to people who are not experts in the field’. However, Journalist H 
noted that the role was very different in that financial journalism is largely:  
 
reporting on private activity that is not automatically open to media scrutiny, like the 
business of government . . . Finance itself is a relationship in the main between the 
buyers and sellers of assets; the journalist is an intruder into that relationship . . . the 
financial journalist is not paid to consider the wider social consequences of 
commercial decisions, so hence the financial journalist has to be able to zone in on the 
strict commercial merits of big decisions. 
 
Some interviewees noted that in addition to the usual tensions on all reporting beats – the 
constant aims of being competitive, fair, accurate, balanced, and avoiding defamation – 
financial journalists faced particular newsgathering constraints. Several of the interviewees 
identified access to information and sensitivity surrounding information as being major 
constraints of the specialism. Journalist H noted that ‘company accounts are by definition 
historical in nature and commercial information is routinely denied to financial journalists by 
a whole plethora of organisations and individuals’. Several of the interviewees pointed out 
that they operate under strong legal constraints: they are constrained by stock market 
regulations concerning the public disclosure of market-sensitive information that affects share 
prices. Journalist D stated that journalists were conscious of the impact of their stories on 
share prices. He noted that ‘market behaviour is more often than not influenced by rumours 
and interpretations of trends so the weight of such consequences is in our minds when 
reporting potentially incendiary stories’. While Journalist B criticized daily financial 
journalism for being ‘almost entirely press release and stock exchange disclosure based’, 
Journalist E noted that the opportunity to undertake investigative financial reporting – of 
company performance, for example – is severely limited because of a lack of resources. 
Moreover, it emerged that the threat of legal action is particularly acute, since they are 
writing frequently about well-funded companies that could afford expensive litigation. While 
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Journalist B noted that ‘very often a threat of an injunction is enough to have a story pulled’, 
according to Journalist H many legal actions by wealthy individuals or companies are 
‘executed purely to stifle genuine inquiry’.  
 
When questioned about their sources it emerged that the financial community served as the 
major pool of sources for business news. As Journalist E observed: ‘the routine sources of 
information are company results, company announcements, regulatory businesses e.g. 
consultations, analysts’ reports and company spokespeople. Company spokespeople often 
brief for their client, but also against their competitors.’ The interviewees also routinely 
consulted documentary sources, including material filed with regulatory and statutory bodies, 
and, as observed by Journalist F, senior journalists have built up a network of senior financial 
sources and do not rely on company spokespeople as frequently as junior colleagues. 
However, he also conceded that because of the need for regular contact with financial 
sources, ‘some journalists are reluctant to be critical of companies because they fear they will 
not get information or access in the future’. Journalist E was more forthright. He believed that 
during the boom some journalists had become ‘far too close to their sources’:  
 
They viewed them as friends and allies and essentially became advocates for them. 
Their approach was justified editorially because many developers and bankers limited 
access to such an extent that it became seen to be better to write soft stories about 
them than to lose access. Extremely soft stories would be run to gain access too – 
indeed, [developer] Seán Fitzpatrick was a particularly coveted source among some 
journalists.  
 
Most of the interviewees mentioned that they are careful to move routinely outside the 
financial community for sources of information. Two interviewees noted that there has often 
been considerable pressure from public relations professionals to influence the content of 
financial news. Disturbingly, Journalist F noted, it was ‘well known that some PR companies 
try to bully journalists by cutting off access or excluding journalists from briefings’, while 
Journalist E stated that there existed ‘an unofficial blanket ban on any engagement with the 
trade union movement, despite their obvious role in the economic system. I have been told by 
editors in the past that they had no place in the business section.’ He also recounted how he 
had witnessed ‘the lack of critical scrutiny of information provided by sources – a fair 
amount of which was deliberate misinformation, particularly surrounding the banks’. In a 
detailed exposition of his work during the boom he recounted how a prominent state source 
for banking stories contacted his editor to complain about how a story had supposedly 
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criticized the individual’s office. He was warned about how his story had damaged the 
newspaper’s relationship with the office and was ‘informally banned’ from writing about that 
office. The newspaper was then given access to a senior official from the office ‘who briefed 
my colleagues on the “correct” position’. Looking back on the affair, Journalist E concluded 
that ‘basically they trusted the banks, the developers and the regulator and never suspected 
that they were misleading them or hiding potentially improper acts from them’.  
 
In terms of the stories they produced, all eight interviewees believed that differences existed 
in the treatment of financial stories depending on the intended audience or readership. They 
all agreed that the style of writing differed for reports written for the news, rather than the 
business, pages of a newspaper. Journalist A noted that there existed ‘a greater tendency to 
avoid technical financial terminology outside the business pages’, while Journalist F noted 
that he would have regularly been told to cleanse his articles of ‘jargon and financial terms’. 
According to Journalist H, such stories tended to more crudely point out who the ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ guys were in a particular development, and, as noted by Journalist E, this process of 
making stories more readable sometimes caused tension between the news and business 
desks:  
 
It also brings its own tensions: the news section is generally interested in the most 
sensational angle on a story, based on their limited knowledge of the field, regardless 
of accuracy. This generally results in a compromise where the story isn’t as precise as 
a business story but it’s in the right ballpark. It is preferable to getting general 
reporters to write the stories as they lack the understanding of terminology and 
financial structures that underpin modern capitalism. 
 
These tensions were also noted by Journalist F who observed that it was ‘not uncommon for 
news-desks to change business copy to make it more “punter friendly”’. Several of the 
interviewees observed that the process of a story transferring from the business to the news 
pages often involved the story referring to why the development was important to the average 
citizen. A commonly-used angle was that of consumer or taxpayer impact. Journalist G 
highlighted stories about mortgage rates or stories that involved a cost to the taxpayer as 
‘extreme examples’ of the general newsworthiness of specialist financial stories. He also 
noted that big company losses or stories involving well-known businessmen might also 
transfer to the general news pages due to their high public profiles.  
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Reporting the boom  
No consensus emerged when the interviewees were asked whether financial journalists had 
been sufficiently critical in their coverage of financial institutions’ practices and government 
policy during the Celtic Tiger years. Several of the interviewees believed that a systematic 
analysis of the published or broadcast reports would demonstrate that financial journalists 
‘did not shirk’ their responsibilities. They argued that they performed their role within the 
constraints of the specialism, and pointed to the pronouncements of high-profile 
commentators and journalists, such as the columnist David McWilliams and former RTÉ 
economics editor George Lee, as examples of critical journalism. However, one journalist 
dissented strongly from this view: Journalist G observed that ‘for the most part they were not 
critical enough and even those that were [critical] in private conversation didn’t express those 
views in their stories. There were some reporters who did criticise policies, but they were in a 
minority and no matter how vocal they were, there is an argument that no one wanted to hear 
it.’ 
 
Some interviewees argued that critical coverage did not receive the prominence in 
newspapers and broadcasts that it warranted. Journalist H observed that ‘business and 
economic journalists constantly questioned the sustainability of the Celtic Tiger economy, but 
it was not always given proper foregrounding. Criticism of government policy was rife 
throughout the period of the boom.’ The same journalist noted ‘there was too much 
acceptance’ of what the banks said about their commercial property lending, but journalists 
who covered this sector ‘found no regulators or outside forces suggesting the problem was as 
big as it later became’. Furthermore, some interviewees felt they had been constrained in their 
newsgathering by the lack of information provided by financial institutions. Referencing the 
property boom, Journalist B said there was ‘a dearth of publicly verifiable information on the 
rise in indebtedness’. Likewise, Journalist A noted that there ‘was no requirement on the 
main players to publicly declare their financial performance and virtually all of them 
exploited the rules governing companies with unlimited liability to avoid public scrutiny of 
their accounts. This was pointed out at the time, repeatedly.’ Nonetheless, the annual reports 
of banks showed the huge reliance on foreign borrowing and high loan-to-deposit ratios, 
which may not have received sufficient critical coverage. However, it must also be 
remembered that some banks ‘adjusted’ their loan books prior to the annual auditing process. 
Anglo Irish Bank temporarily moved €87 million of loans to Irish Nationwide Building 
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Society every year. These circular loans misled not just journalists but also auditors, 
shareholders, and the banking regulator.  
 
Some of the interviewees mentioned the tensions involved in reporting on business for news 
organizations that were heavily reliant on advertising revenue from property and financial 
organizations. Journalist C noted that ‘much of the mainstream media seems to me to be very 
conflicted because of their reliance on real-estate and recruitment advertising. That doesn’t 
mean reporters consciously avoid writing bad news stories, but it’s hard to run against the 
tide when everyone is getting rich.’ The importance of property advertising to media 
organizations was illustrated in 2006 when the Irish Times paid €50 million for the property 
website myhome.ie. Indeed, in their study of the Irish Times’ housing and property issues, 
Preston and Silke (2011) found that coverage was biased in its selection of sources – the 
majority came from the mortgage, real-estate, building and banking industries – and 
uncritical in terms how such statements were utilised in reportage. Significantly, Journalist F 
believed that journalists ‘were leaned on by their organisations not to talk down the banks 
[and the] property market because those organisations have a heavy reliance on property 
advertising’. At its most public, this became manifest in the well-publicized departure of 
Sunday Tribune business editor, Richard Delevan, in 2007, when he reported that a prominent 
estate agent was struggling to sell his own house amid what his company was calling a 
bullish housing market in its press statements (Cullen, 2007).  
 
On top of all these pressures there existed a consensus among the interviewees that journalists 
who took a critical view of the boom were excluded from receiving off-the-record 
information, and were often ‘shouted down’ by politicians or special interests. The comment 
by former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern in 2007 in which he wondered why those 
who were criticizing the economy did not ‘commit suicide’ (RTÉ, 2007) was mentioned in 
several interviews as being symptomatic of this process of marginalization. The comment 
was prompted by a late 2006 Irish Times article by university economist Morgan Kelly who 
predicted a property crash (Kelly, 2006). Alongside politicians, property developers were also 
vocal in demonizing those who critically examined the boom. In early 2006, high-profile 
developer Seán Dunne criticized those in the media whom he referred to as ‘the harbingers of 
doom and gloom’ (McDonald and Sheridan, 2008, p. 268). Crucially, the interviewees linked 
the tone of coverage to experience and expertise, with Journalist F noting that few journalists 
had business or economics degrees. Journalist E was harsher in his assessment, noting that ‘a 
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lot of the journalists involved didn’t have specific knowledge of their sectors and lack the 
interest to educate themselves on them’. Journalist C observed that the more financially 
literate journalists were the ones that were the most critical, as relatively few financial 
journalists ‘really understand the numbers and the trends, so there doesn’t tend to be much 
independent thinking’. Notably, the two journalists most referenced by the interviewees as 
evidence of critical thinking within the specialism, George Lee and David McWilliams, are 
both economics graduates and worked as economists before becoming journalists. 
 
Reporting post-boom  
Significantly, all eight interviewees agreed that the type and tone of financial reporting 
changed when the scale of the global financial crisis and scandals in the Irish banking sector 
emerged. Journalist A noted that it was ‘inevitable that reports on an economic meltdown and 
corporate malfeasance have their own style and tone. The tone was no different in past 
scandals and past crises.’ Journalist D noted that ‘suddenly the stakes became far greater. 
Banks overtook politicians as sources of scandal and financial news became far more relevant 
to a general audience.’ Interestingly, Journalist G noted that while coverage changed, this 
suited news outlets because, for such institutions, bad news is good news:  
 
Yes, financial reporters have become much more critical of regulations and regulators 
as well as those that are seen to be to blame for the crisis. The tone of financial 
journalism has become angrier – in print, but particularly in broadcast – but this can 
be partly explained as capturing the mood of the people. Financial journalism has 
become much more closely read in the last two years, in my opinion – partly as 
people try to understand what happened, but also because newspapers are pushing 
financial news more – bad news sells. 
 
Journalist B noted that while business journalists had been critical of certain aspects of the 
boom before the crash, ‘the tone turned negative as the scale of incompetence, at both the 
regulator and at the banks’ executive level, was exposed’. Journalist C noted that ‘the 
economy and business has become the new sport or politics, dominating the front pages. The 
tone has clearly changed as well.’ Coverage, he believed, was now ‘far more critical and 
economists have become the new celebrities’. Likewise, Journalist F noted that ‘reporters 
have become much quicker to question figures presented by either government or companies 
and to ask whether the information has been independently audited as accurate’. Journalist H 
believed that coverage has ‘became more critical, more investigative and more sceptical’. 
Journalists, he believed, have developed ‘a healthy scepticism’ towards the business 
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community. However, one interviewee, Journalist E, dissented from this new ‘healthy 
scepticism’ belief. He noted that ‘most of the top bankers are gone, the regulator is gone but 
the financial journalists who so woefully reported their sectors remain in place. And they still 
aren’t holding industry to account.’ 
 
Asked whether they now felt they could be more critical of the financial system, all eight 
interviewees agreed that they could be, though many questioned the degree to which critical 
analysis had been or could be carried out. Journalist A noted that comment pieces, rather than 
straight reporting, allowed journalists to be critical, while Journalist B observed that 
journalists could be critical ‘by writing about the bonus culture that fuels short-termism, by 
challenging broker recommendations, by pointing out conflicts of interest and by having the 
courage to take a stand on certain issues’. Journalist C noted that journalists should be 
‘questioning’, but queried what he saw as the increasingly blurred lines between reportage 
and comment. But some interviewees viewed such developments as too little too late, and 
again questioned whether they had been sufficiently critical during the boom years. 
According to Journalist E:  
 
The problems that we have seen in Irish financial journalism in recent years have been 
due largely to its unquestioning support for the elite consensus. There have been 
critical financial journalists but they have largely been marginalised by their 
profession. For instance, during the property boom, the journalists shouldn’t have 
been just reporting what the developers said, they should have been asking ‘where’s 
the demand for all these houses?’ and ‘how do you propose servicing your debt?’ 
 
Journalist F expressed similar sentiments by noting that ‘during the boom years very few 
reporters asked critical questions for fear their access would be denied by PR people or [they] 
didn’t have the knowledge to ask detailing and probing questions’. But he concluded ‘that has 
changed and, if anything, most reporters now distrust everything they are told’. However, 
several interviewees pointed out that even with the crash, the news production process has 
not changed that much. Journalist D observed that ‘there is little space for in-depth 
questioning and analysis in a sound-bite driven, conveyor-belt news environment’, while 
Journalist G acknowledged that financial journalists ‘operate within that system and within 
[or] on the fringes of certain circles of knowledge. If they are overly critical of those within 
those circles, they can lose out on access to that knowledge and therefore they lose stories. 
They have to tread a fine line.’  
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However, this newfound sense of public scepticism on the part of journalists has not gone 
down well with politicians or business moguls. In a 2010 speech the then minister for 
finance, Brian Lenihan, called for journalists ‘to be aware of the self-fulfilling nature of 
doomsday scenarios’, because media coverage could ‘undermine or promote confidence in 
our economy’. Negative reports at home were, Lenihan declared, ‘beamed around the world 
and can influence the decisions of foreign investors and multinationals’ (Cullen, 2010). In 
response, Fintan O’Toole (2010) of the Irish Times pointed out that Lenihan’s complaint 
sounded very like the situation in 2007 and 2008 when, as it became clear that an economic 
crash was looming, the government, the financial regulator, and the Central Bank insisted that 
there was nothing to worry about, that Irish banks were robust, and, if anything, we were 
heading for a soft landing. As O’Toole saw it, journalists are now critically engaged because 
they had ‘learned the hard way not to trust emollient assurances that everything will be okay’. 
Politicians were now ‘the opposite to the boy who cried wolf – even when the politicians 
insist there is no wolf, journalists listen for the howling in the woods’. In a similar vein to 
Lenihan, in a radio interview, former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern (Edwards, 2011) called for an 
investigation into the media for what he claimed was the failure of journalists to properly 
report an overheating economy. This had happened, Ahern alleged, because journalists had 
focused all their attention on him and the investigation into his financial affairs by a 
government-appointed tribunal of inquiry. As he bluntly put it:  
 
The government were following the economy but the media weren’t. It was a very 
poor job by the media really. They were shown to be incompetent and that was the 
trouble, everything was on me . . . There should be an investigation into it. They 
should have been following the economy from August 2007, but they weren’t, they 
were following me. I think a lot of these guys really should have looked at 
themselves. 
 
Business and media moguls have also joined the chorus of condemnation. In 2009, one of 
Ireland’s leading businessmen and media moguls, Denis O’Brien (2009), declared that ‘some 
journalists are anti-business and anti-enterprise’. It must, however, be noted that O’Brien was 
a participant in the Moriarty Tribunal established to investigate payments to politicians by 
businessmen. The tribunal found that O’Brien had made two payments totalling half-a-
million Irish pounds to a politician, Michael Lowry, and that Lowry, while minister for 
communications, had ‘secured the winning’ of the 1995 mobile telephone license for 
O’Brien’s company Esat Telecom (Keena, Lally and Collins, 2011). 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This study demonstrates that the professional tensions at the heart of business journalism in 
other jurisdictions are also present in the professional roles, routines, and work practices of 
Irish financial journalists. Firstly, no consensus emerged regarding the role or function of 
financial journalism: while some interviewees viewed it as explaining complex financial 
developments to the public, others viewed it as essentially reporting developments in what 
are (or were) private businesses. Secondly, there existed tensions and constraints in relation 
to accessing information, concerns about the market sensitivity of certain information, a fear 
of expensive litigation, and a lack of time and resources to conduct detailed long-term 
analysis or investigations. Thirdly, there existed effective source capture in that the 
journalists operated in a closed network of information sources. While they largely disagreed 
that they were part of an elite communication network, they stated that their sources were 
largely drawn from the broad financial community, which in turn comprised a large part of 
their readership/audience. Moreover, the responses indicate that the tendency for financial 
journalists to operate within closed networks was more pronounced during the boom years, as 
the lack of criticism from regulatory, economic, or policy sources contributed to the lack of 
criticism in news coverage. For the most part, the journalists operated within a tightly-knit 
circle of powerful interest groups that all stressed the positive aspects of light-touch 
regulation. The gatekeeping tactics of public relations professionals only added to this tight 
circle of established sources. Fourthly, there existed a strong awareness of the intended 
audience for stories, with tension sometimes emerging as stories migrated from business to 
general news pages.  
 
Fifthly, there existed no consensus on whether financial journalism had been sufficiently 
critical during the boom years. There existed a belief that dissenting views did not receive 
sustained prominence in coverage during the boom, and that anyone who dissented from the 
view that the good times would last forever would be shouted down and demonized. The 
tension between analysing an economic boom and property corruption, and the dependence 
of media outlets on property advertising revenue, was instanced by several journalists as a 
potential conflict of interest that could have compromised media credibility. Lastly, there 
existed a strong consensus that the crisis empowered journalists to be more critical of the 
financial system. However, there also existed a belief that the news production process had 
not been radically altered since the crisis, as the instantaneous nature of journalism meant that 
there was little time or space for in-depth analysis. The fact that such limited criticality arises 
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only in the wake of an economic crisis (and arguably in response to a heightened public 
demand for accountability) is worrying. It may be that all concerned – the business 
community, educators, media institutions, journalists, and the public – need to change the 
perception that financial news is of relevance to the public only when things go wrong.  
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